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NO. 25 APRIL 2021 Introduction 
New Trade Agreements in Asia 
Liberalisation in Times of Geopolitical Rivalry 
Hanns Günther Hilpert 
With the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) on 
15 November 2020, the announcement of the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement 
on Investment (CAI) on 30 December, and the prospects of enlarging the Compre-
hensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), trade policy 
with and within Asia is gathering speed. In the greater East Asia region, consisting 
of Japan, South Korea, China and the Association of Southeast Asian nations (ASEAN), 
economic integration via trade, investment, supply chains and digital connectivity 
will accelerate. In contrast, regions that remain on the outside – i.e. North America, 
Europe and India – surely fear that trade flows will be diverted. At the same time, 
geopolitics have become a determining factor of trade policy. Any agreement also 
represents political positioning in the context of the Sino-American rivalry, or at least 
a reinsurance against the risks of economic or technological decoupling. What are 
the economic and political perspectives of these trade and investment agreements? 
What goals and strategies are the relevant actors pursuing? And what are the con-
sequences for Europe’s trade policy? 
 
The remarkable economic success that East 
Asia has achieved in the past five decades 
has not been built on isolation and autarky. 
On the contrary, such high growth rates, 
rapid industrialisation and regional wealth 
creation would hardly have been possible 
without foreign trade and trade-related 
direct investment. Intra-Asian trade is now 
greater than Asia’s trade with the rest of the 
world. In fact, Asia itself has become the 
world’s largest trading region, with China 
as its natural centre. However, the foreign 
trade environment has fundamentally 
changed since the turn of the millennium, 
and hence the continuation of the region’s 
decades-long upward trajectory is now less 
assured than before. 
From Trade Policy to 
Geoeconomics 
Whether, and if so, for how long the well-
established Pax Americana security order 
can continue to secure Asia’s geopolitical 
stability has become uncertain. While the 
US’s role as a guarantor of regional peace 
continues to be highly esteemed by its local 
allies and trading partners, China is now 
the most important trade centre for all 
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countries in the region, and its share of 
the regional supply and sales markets con-
tinues to grow. At the same time, the 
“Middle Kingdom” is increasingly acting as 
a revisionist superpower. Beijing’s aggres-
sive foreign policy shows that its political 
supremacy and growing military clout have 
heightened China’s willingness to assert its 
interests in a conflictual manner – quite 
brutally, if necessary – through the use of 
economic and military threats. 
In general, trade policy, which is osten-
sibly oriented towards national economic 
interests, is increasingly dominated by 
foreign and security policy considerations. 
The USA is actively decoupling China in 
technologically sensitive areas and forcing 
allies and partner states to follow suit. The 
People’s Republic, in turn, is attempting 
to reduce its vulnerability as it strives for 
technological autonomy. Companies from 
third countries fear, with good reason, that 
they will be forced to choose sides in the 
course of this conflict. China and the USA 
aren’t shying away from using sanctions, 
boycotts and punitive tariffs as means of 
coercion in their foreign policies. Other 
countries, first and foremost Japan, are also 
shaping their trade policies strategically 
and are explicitly pursuing geopolitical 
agendas. 
The shift towards geoeconomics is fur-
thered by the progressive erosion of the 
multilateral framework espoused by the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO, 
founded in 1994, has so far only rudimen-
tarily fulfilled its contractual obligation to 
liberalise multilateral trade. The Organiza-
tion’s trade dispute settlement mechanisms 
have been on hold since December 2019, 
when the corresponding judges’ positions 
first went unfilled. What’s more, China 
continuously disregards fundamental prin-
ciples such as non-discrimination, most-
favoured-nation (MFN) treatment and trans-
parency while the USA (under Trump) has 
repeatedly violated the Organization’s 
treaty. Both countries’ transgressions con-
tinue to be unaddressed by the WTO and its 
affected member states. At the same time, 
if trade law and liberalisation are not ad-
vanced by the WTO, then it is hardly sur-
prising that Asia’s trading states – which 
are so dependent on the global economy – 
are making their own bilateral and multi-
lateral arrangements. Interest in trade and 
investment, which stimulate development 
and growth, continues unabated in the 
region. However, this is now increasingly 
supplemented by elements of geopolitics 
in a structure-building manner. 
RCEP – Trade Liberalisation 
“the ASEAN Way” 
With the Regional Comprehensive Eco-
nomic Partnership (RCEP), the ten ASEAN 
countries together with Japan, China, South 
Korea, Australia and New Zealand will estab-
lish the largest free trade area in the world. 
The agreement will come into force as soon 
as it has been ratified by at least six ASEAN 
countries and three other partners. In terms 
of its sheer dimensions – encompassing 
2.2 billion people and around 30 percent of 
world’s production and trade – the agree-
ment can hardly be understated. For the 
first time, through RCEP, the G20 countries 
of Northeast Asia – Japan, China and South 
Korea – will also be linked in a trade agree-
ment. 
RCEP documents the centrality of the 
ASEAN community’s foundational contri-
bution to the agreement, for which it took 
the initiative and lead. The immediate 
motive of the negotiations was to consoli-
date the existing “ASEAN+1 Free Trade 
Agreement” framework by incorporating 
all relevant parties under one arrangement. 
As a result, RCEP should not be considered 
a deep, ambitious trade agreement. The 
agreed upon standards – for example on 
intellectual property rights, services, invest-
ment and trade-related free movement of 
persons – are consistently weak and lack a 
future vision. Nonetheless, it was precisely 
this low level of ambition that made it pos-
sible to include developing countries, which 
were also granted individualised elongated 
transition periods and differentiated adjust-
ments. This approach was in line with the 
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aspirations and objectives pursued by 
ASEAN, namely, to unite the states of the 
Indo-Pacific region in a large, open trade 
and investment area that promotes eco-
nomic integration, growth and develop-
ment while simultaneously integrating less 
developed states and counteracting the per-
ceived divisive tendencies of the former 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) initiative. 
The signing of the agreement does not mark 
the end of negotiations. RCEP is to be open 
to accession by third countries, particularly 
India, which dropped out of the agreement 
at the last moment. Further development 
of the agreement’s content is also planned. 
This is to be expected, as we know from 
past experience that ASEAN trade agree-
ments start out weak, but then are succes-
sively improved upon and modernised. It is 
envisaged that an RCEP secretariat, which 
is yet to be established, will ensure that the 
agreement is continuously adapted and 
developed. 
In terms of trade policy, liberalisation 
and facilitation of trade in goods are at the 
centre of the agreement. When it enters 
into force, 65 percent of RCEP’s intra-trade 
will be duty-free, and after twenty years this 
figure should be at least 92 percent. How-
ever, liberalisation is not uniform. About 
half of the countries apply different tariff 
rates, depending on the RCEP trading part-
ner. In addition, varying customs tariff sys-
tems apply. Nonetheless, customs clearance 
will be much simpler. For example, a single 
document covering several processing 
stages and border crossings will suffice to 
prove the origin of goods. Documentation 
of data accompanying the trade will be able 
to occur centrally, in RCEP member coun-
tries. 
Tariff reductions outlined within the 
agreement mainly concern industrial, less 
agricultural, goods. While the ASEAN coun-
tries are barely reducing their already low 
bilateral external tariffs, the tariff reduc-
tions by China (and to a lesser extent South 
Korea) vis-à-vis Japan are quite substantial. 
This has caused some observers in Japan to 
even refer to RCEP as a “China-Japan free 
trade agreement”. An immense facilitator 
of trade will be seen in the uniform appli-
cation of the comparatively easy-to-handle 
ASEAN rules of origin, which serve as proof 
that only goods from the RCEP free trade 
area, but not from third countries, benefit 
from tariff exemption. 
With a reasonable amount of bureau-
cratic effort it will be possible to cumulate 
rules of origin over several stages of national 
processing. As a rule, the minimum value-
added share on a “Free On Board” (FOB) 
basis is set at a modest 40 percent, which 
means a maximum share for supplies from 
third countries of 60 percent. According to 
a forecast by Euler Hermes, harmonising 
the information requirements and setting 
a uniform minimum value-added would 
save US$90 billion in costs per year in intra-
RCEP goods trade. 
The American economists Peter Petri and 
Michael Plummer estimate that RCEP trade 
will increase by US$500 billion per year 
after treaty implementation and that trade-
related income will amount to US$186 bil-
lion per year, with China accounting for 
about half of these figures and Japan for 
just under a quarter. Accordingly, North-
east Asia will benefit more from tariff reduc-
tions than Southeast Asia, Australia, and 
New Zealand. There are two reasons for 
this: first, Northeast Asia hosts the larger 
economies in absolute terms, and second, 
China and South Korea are making the 
biggest cuts to their tariffs. At the same 
time, trade gains are offset by trade diver-
sions. Thus, from a dynamic perspective, 
the intensification of trade and investment 
links in the RCEP region is at the expense of 
trans-Pacific and Eurasian trade and invest-
ment flows, even if Asian branches of Euro-
pean or American companies benefit from 
the facilitation and liberalisation of trade in 
goods just as much as local businesses. 
Likely to be even more important than its 
direct effects on trade is the agreement’s im-
pact on investment and the configuration 
of value chains. The combination of reduced 
tariffs, facilitated cross-border trade and 
standardised rules of origin will trigger a re-
organisation of supply chains. This is all the 
more true as China – a major producer – is 
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already under pressure due to costs and 
American punitive tariffs while Beijing 
purses a policy of economic and techno-
logical upgrading. The poorer countries 
in Southeast Asia – including Cambodia, 
Myanmar, Indonesia and the Philippines – 
could benefit from this, as these investment 
destinations must now meet new and har-
monised RCEP standards. 
China Wins 
The boost to economic integration provided 
by RCEP will benefit China in particular. 
RCEP and the complementary CPTPP agree-
ment (see below) support national growth 
in the region and its external orientation 
towards the Chinese industrial core by 
enabling trade integration in an enlarged 
East Asia, thereby increasing the competi-
tiveness of “Made in Asia” goods and ser-
vices. The People’s Republic is thus likely to 
further expand its role as a regional centre 
of gravity and strength. Beijing’s Belt and 
Road Initiative further supports this trend 
because it creates economic dependencies 
that favour China. China’s position is also 
strengthened by the fact that the four-
decade-long trend of higher economic growth 
in East Asia compared to other world 
regions will continue. This is all the more 
plausible considering that the region is cop-
ing comparatively well with the COVID-19 
pandemic in terms of health policy and the 
economy, and will have to work through 
fewer structural distortions after this crisis. 
China is also the political winner of RCEP. 
Indeed, political motives are likely to have 
prompted the country’s willingness to com-
promise. With the conclusion of the nego-
tiations in the end of 2019, China proved 
that it could resist America’s efforts to con-
tain and isolate it. The signing of the agree-
ment in November 2020 represents regional 
accord, despite Beijing’s aggressive foreign 
policy towards some of its neighbours that 
same year. 
India Loses 
India ultimately refused the RCEP compro-
mise in November 2019, after 31 rounds of 
negotiations and 18 ministerial meetings. 
By not participating in the agreement, India 
is missing out on US$60 billion in income 
annually, economists Petri and Plummer 
estimate. The country’s exclusion from 
Asia’s supply chains will have a lasting im-
pact on the development and industrialisa-
tion of the Indian subcontinent. Politically, 
however, New Delhi’s decision is at least 
partly understandable. India’s federal gov-
ernment feared import competition from 
China (industrial goods), from Australia 
(dairy products) and from Southeast Asia 
(spices) and was not prepared to accept free 
trade in digital data and source codes. On the 
other hand, India could not push through its 
own demands, such as those for a snapback 
mechanism in the face of excessive imports 
of goods, for more restrictive rules of origin 
– which would protect its industry – and 
for a wider opening of RCEP services mar-
kets. Above all, liberalising trade in goods 
with China was and is politically unfeasible 
in the country. This is because India already 
has a high deficit here; the bilateral trade 
structure is perceived as colonialist, Chinese 
competition as unfair. 
From the mid-1990s, New Delhi success-
fully pursued a policy of foreign trade liber-
alisation and global economic integration, 
but under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, 
a change of course has taken place. As the 
current economic policy guidelines “Make 
in India” and “Self-Reliant India” indicate, 
the development strategy is once again ori-
ented inwards. Industrial policy has gained 
importance and external protections are 
increasing, especially vis-à-vis China. 
CAI – Prioritizing Market Access 
Shortly before the end of 2020, the EU and 
China agreed on a Comprehensive Agree-
ment on Investment (CAI) preceded by 34 
tough rounds of negotiations over seven 
years. The prospect of a common Western 
 SWP Comment 25 
 April 2021 
 5 
trade front had forced China to make deci-
sive concessions shortly before the Biden 
administration took office. As a result, the 
CAI will substantially improve European 
companies’ access to the Chinese market 
and make the playing field for investors in 
China a bit fairer and more rule-bound on 
an MFN-basis, while the EU’s internal mar-
ket remains open to Chinese investors. 
With the CAI, China renounces forced tech-
nology transfer and joint venture coercion, 
and promises transparency of state sub-
sidies and state-owned enterprise regula-
tions. In a sustainability chapter, Beijing 
also accepts best effort clauses to comply 
with environmental and labour standards. 
It has even promised to sign the conven-
tions of the International Labour Organisa-
tion (ILO) on forced labour. 
However, it is questionable whether, and 
if so, how stringently the CAI will be imple-
mented. On the one hand, due to past nega-
tive experiences, there is great scepticism 
as to whether China will actually keep the 
promises it has made. At the very least, it 
will require strong political efforts on the 
part of the EU to press for active implemen-
tation in line with the agreement. On the 
other side of the coin, in view of fierce criti-
cism of the CAI in Europe, it is uncertain 
whether the agreement will be signed at 
all during 2022’s French EU Presidency, let 
alone be ratified by the European Parlia-
ment. 
It is obvious that the EU is positioning 
itself as an autonomous trade policy actor 
that not only advocates for improved mar-
ket access for European companies – ex-
tracting considerable concessions from 
China in the process – but also for a rules-
based trade order that enforces its own 
regulatory standards. With the CAI, the EU 
is sticking to its policy of integration and 
interdependence vis-à-vis China in principle 
and is not seeking to decouple itself from 
the People’s Republic, at least economically, 
even if political differences have grown in 
recent years. 
However, this trade policy positioning 
comes at the cost of foreign policy credibil-
ity. Under Xi Jinping’s reign, China has 
hardened its authoritarian stance and, espe-
cially in the past year, pursued aggressive 
foreign policies towards Hong Kong, Tai-
wan, Australia, India and Sweden. In light 
of this, critics from European civil society, 
media and politics rightly see the EU’s 
agreement with Beijing as opportunistic 
acceptance of Chinese realpolitik. By con-
sciously and visibly deciding to prioritize 
market access, the EU loses political per-
suasiveness in claiming to represent the 
values of democracy, freedom, the rule of 
law and human rights vis-à-vis its “systemic 
rival” China. Moreover, the timing of the 
conclusion of the negotiations could hardly 
have been worse, immediately before 
the Democratic Biden administration took 
office and openly promoted a common 
China policy for the West. The CAI will not 
make it easy for Europe and the USA to find 
a unified position vis-à-vis Beijing. But this 
is most likely what China hoped to achieve 
with its concessions shortly before the end 
of Germany’s EU Council Presidency. Now 
China can present itself as a responsible 
great power committed to multilateralism. 
For Europe, the bitter realisation remains 
that the EU has yet to find the right balance 
between its foreign economic interests and 
foreign policy aspirations. 
CPTPP – on the Way 
to Enlargement 
In January 2017, under newly inaugurated 
President Donald Trump, the USA withdrew 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 
agreement, which had been negotiated 
under American guidance and leadership. 
Nonetheless, the remaining eleven coun-
tries agreed to pursue the initiative without 
Washington. Indeed, on 8 March 2018, Aus-
tralia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malay-
sia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore 
and Vietnam signed the agreement under 
a new name, the Comprehensive and Pro-
gressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partner-
ship (CPTPP, also TPP-11). 22 clauses were 
suspended – but not removed – from the 
original text of the agreement, mostly in 
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the area of intellectual property rights. The 
CPTPP entered into force on 30 December 
2018 for Australia, Japan, Canada, Mexico, 
New Zealand and Singapore, and on 14 
January 2019 for Vietnam. Brunei, Chile, 
Malaysia and Peru have not yet ratified 
the CPTPP. 
Even without American participation, 
the CPTPP is the most important trade 
agreement since the foundation of the WTO 
in 1994. Its achievements include far-reach-
ing liberalisations, ground-breaking devel-
opment of trade rules and its strategic posi-
tion as a spearhead of global trade liber-
alisation open to accession. For the EU, the 
CPTPP is equally partner, competitor and 
adversary in the international regulatory 
arena. The newly established United States-
Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) nego-
tiated in 2017/2018 already used numerous 
CPTPP treaty clauses as a template. 
The agreements reached in the CPTPP 
look to the future. Industrial and merchan-
dise trade will be almost absolutely liber-
alised. When the agreement enters into 
force, 86 percent of tariff lines will be duty-
free; after fifteen years, this figure will be 
99 percent. Non-discrimination, MFN treat-
ment, freedom of establishment and trans-
parency are comprehensively and legally 
guaranteed for analogue and digital ser-
vices. All relevant protection standards 
apply to investments. In cases of expropria-
tion and discrimination, investor-states can 
pursue arbitration. The agreement’s sus-
tainability chapters commit signatories to 
ILO protection standards and relevant inter-
national environmental accords. With 
regard to state-owned enterprises, CPTPP 
members commit to the principles of non-
discrimination, non-subsidisation, trans-
parency, neutral oversight and commercial 
orientation. Special technical committees 
will ensure that the agreement is imple-
mented in accordance with the treaty and, 
if necessary, adjust its contents. Member 
states will be responsible for internal co-
ordination and cooperation as well as exter-
nal representation through annually rotat-
ing chairmanships. 
The CPTPP is also on the verge of enlarge-
ment. Numerous countries have expressed 
interest in membership, including the 
United Kingdom, Colombia, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand and even the People’s 
Republic of China. The sequence of future 
enlargements will largely determine how 
the CPTPP positions itself in the realms of 
trade and geopolitics. 
Nonetheless, so far only the United King-
dom has formally applied for membership 
(on 1 February 2021). The British govern-
ment hopes that CPTPP membership will 
help it achieve its desired post-Brexit new 
start in trade policy while also manifesting 
its dream of a “Global Britain” in an anglo-
sphere world. The UK’s chances of acceding 
are good. From the CPTPP member perspec-
tive, the UK would be an economically 
attractive new member. Moreover, it should 
not be particularly difficult for the country 
to fulfil the obligations of the agreement. 
However, the character of the CPTPP would 
fundamentally change if a non-Pacific lit-
toral state were to be admitted. The CPTPP 
would then be less of a Pacific regional free 
trade area and more of a free-trade-oriented 
globalisation club dominated by the Anglo-
sphere. In this respect, Britain’s accession 
should not be regarded as a foregone con-
clusion. 
In principle, the return of the USA to the 
agreement is also possible. It is very likely 
that the CPTPP members would be willing 
to reinstate the 22 treaty clauses suspended 
during renegotiations in order to facilitate 
the country’s accession. Such would not 
only bring substantial revenue to the USA, 
but would also grant it an instrument with 
which it could contain China’s geopolitical 
ambitions. However, domestically, it would 
currently be difficult to negotiate the open-
ing of the American market that the CPTPP 
requires. In view of America’s precarious 
domestic situation, the priorities of the 
Biden presidency do not lie in foreign eco-
nomic policy, at least for the time being. 
China’s desire to join, prominently voiced 
by Xi Jinping himself, has several motives. 
First, with CPTPP membership, the country 
could broaden its exports and imports, 
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realising significant income gains in the 
process. Second, similar to China’s WTO 
accession in 2001, the admission conditions 
could be used to push through politically 
difficult domestic reforms. Third, as a CPTPP 
member, the People’s Republic would be 
excellently positioned to help shape global 
trade rules in the future. Fourth, China’s 
participation in the agreement could defuse 
the Sino-American trade conflict. And fifth, 
joining would be seen as a diplomatic vic-
tory over the USA. However, it is question-
able whether China would ever be able to 
fulfil the strictly worded treaty clauses on 
state-owned enterprises, intellectual prop-
erty rights, sustainability and freedom of 
establishment for foreign-controlled digital 
companies. For the country to join, CPTPP 
members would have to concede to less 
specific and less strict entry conditions. This 
is not expected however. After all, the un-
spoken purpose of the CPTPP is to commit 
Beijing to a rules-based trade regime. Once 
it joins, however, China would no longer be 
forced to change its protectionist structures 
and discriminatory behaviour. 
Taiwan would have comparatively few 
problems meeting the CPTPP accession 
criteria. Admittedly, the country’s politically 
well-connected agricultural lobby would 
fiercely resist a market opening, but it 
would probably have little domestic politi-
cal clout if the agreement’s proponents 
were to point to the upgrade to Taiwan’s 
international political profile should it join. 
Unsurprisingly, however, China has already 
declared its opposition to Taiwan’s admis-
sion even though, as a non-member, it can-
not block the potential process. Still, China 
would likely brand such a move as inter-
ference in its internal affairs and exert 
political pressure on all CPTPP members 
to oppose Taiwan’s admission. 
Japan will play a central role in upcom-
ing accession negotiations. The country is 
the de facto leader of the CPTPP and holds 
this year’s chairmanship. The transfer of 
the TPP initiative to the CPTPP would not 
have been possible without Tokyo’s decisive 
action. For beyond liberalisation, trade 
policy has been a strategic instrument of 
foreign policy for both the administrations 
of Shinzo Abe (2012-2020) and Yoshihide 
Suga (since September 2020). In congruence 
with Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” 
(FOIP) strategy, officially announced in 
2016, the CPTPP is meant to contain China’s 
economic offensives. Against this backdrop, 
the Japanese trade bureaucracy has already 
made it clear that it will insist on rigorous 
liberalisation and regulatory standards and 
will not accept watering down the content 
of the agreement to make a major (i.e. Chi-
na’s) accession possible. In this context, 
liberal UK’s application for membership 
comes in handy for Tokyo. London could 
be used as a model for accession, setting a 
standard that China would certainly not 
be able to meet. 
Conclusions for Europe 
The new EU strategy for an open, sustain-
able and assertive trade policy sets the 
necessary groundwork to be able to deal 
with the Chinese challenge in a realistic 
and defensive manner. However, aside from 
China, Asia remains virtually unmentioned 
in the strategy despite being the most dy-
namic and, in terms of its volume, the most 
important economic region in the world. 
Moreover, if the EU is to maintain and 
strengthen the rules-based trade order, 
especially in the face of Beijing’s offensives, 
close cooperation with like-minded actors 
in the Indo-Pacific region, including Japan, 
South Korea, Australia, Singapore and 
Canada, is indispensable. 
European trade policy should do two 
things. First, it should expand Indo-Pacific 
trade and investment links beyond China, 
or at least mitigate existing dependencies 
on the Chinese market. Bi- and multilateral 
agreements can be useful to this end. In 
particular, the negotiations for EU-Australia 
and EU-New Zealand free trade agreements, 
which have been ongoing since mid-2018, 
should be brought to a swift conclusion. 
Second, the EU should also enter into 
free trade negotiations with the CPTPP as a 
group. At the very least, the EU and the 
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CPTPP should mutually agree on further 
developing and modernising global trade 
rules, especially in the areas of intellectual 
property rights, sustainability, safeguards, 
subsidies, state-owned enterprises, digital 
trade and the settlement of investor-state 
disputes. Should a deal be reached with 
Australia and New Zealand, the EU would 
be linked in a free trade agreement with 
all those states that have ratified the CPTPP. 
This would provide an excellent political 
and legal basis for a Euro-Indo-Pacific part-
nership that would extend beyond trade 
policy to foreign policy. 
EU-China trade and foreign relations wit-
ness both sides pursuing analogous inter-
ests that overlap in most areas. Seeing that 
far-reaching convergence on regulatory 
issues already exists (or has been achieved 
in individual free trade agreements), co-
operation with the CPTPP would also im-
prove the chances that EU standards are 
enforced globally. Finally, a Euro-Indo-
Pacific partnership would also be important 
when looking to the USA. Such could help 
counter the recurring trend towards protec-
tionism and unilateralism in America with 
much more persuasive and assertive power. 
Dr Hanns Günther Hilpert is Head of the Asia Research Division at SWP. 
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